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Enforcement is a costly endeavor.  Thus, governments ought to be 
innovative in designing less costly policies, yet, effective in preventing crime.  To 
this end, this paper suggests using insights from behavioral law and economics.  
Empirical evidence demonstrates that police have an important effect in 
deterring crime.  However, increasing the number of policemen is a costly policy.  
Therefore, this paper explores policy changes, which exploit offender’s 
ambiguity aversion in order to reduce crime without increasing the police force.  
Namely, empirical evidence suggests that criminals are better deterred by 
ambiguous detection.  Thus, this paper analyzes the ways to randomize the 
apprehension strategies to meet this end.  Furthermore, it provides new evidence, 
based on a survey carried out for the purpose of this paper, that potential 
violators are largely not aware of policy changes.  Inasmuch as the information 
regarding the intensified uncertainty is essential to its success, this paper 
discusses the possibility to increase criminals’ awareness through the 
“availability heuristic.” 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Criminal justice expenditure constitutes a significant part of countries’ 
spending. For instance, in 2007, the United States (U.S.) spent $288 billion on 
police, correction institutions, and courts.1  Governments often seek ways to 
reduce this expenditure without harming the efficiency of combating crime.  The 
need for a reduction in this expenditure grew even further in light of the global 
crisis over the period 2008 - 2010 and following sovereign debt crisis in 2010 -
2012 in the European Union (EU).2  Resulting budget consolidations in some of 
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the EU countries led to significant cuts in expenditure on enforcement, i.e. police 
and prison expenditure.3  For instance, in the United Kingdom (UK) the budget 
of public order and safety, in relative terms, was reduced significantly by the 
austerity measures in recent years.4  Similarly, the police authorities in Finland 
face budget reductions in the upcoming period.5  Despite the necessity of budget 
cuts, their implementation in the enforcement of law ought to be cautious.  To be 
precise, governments might be myopic regarding the elements of the enforcement 
system, which might continue functioning with reduced budgets.  Therefore, 
empirical findings concerning the importance of different crime control measures 
should be taken into account when deciding on austerity plans. 
The law and economics approach to enforcement asserts that crime 
control can be achieved through deterrence.6  Empirical evidence largely supports 
the concept of deterrence and discusses the effectiveness of severity and certainty 
of punishment.7  According to those studies, the deterrence effect mostly 
attributed to the probability8 of punishment, rather than to its severity.9  
Furthermore, a number of studies demonstrated a significant deterrence effect 
due to police force presence.10 
Taking into consideration the significant costs of police services,11 policy 
implications of the abovementioned evidence are a challenging task.  
Implementing constant police surveillance would be a burden on the country’s 
budget, especially in light of the recent EU debt crisis.  Furthermore, this kind of 
                                                                                                                                    
found in other European countries. In England and Wales the prison service budget cuts led to a 
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5 Interview with Esa Käyhkö, supra note 2. 
6 See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POLIT. 
ECON. 169, 170 (1968). 
7 See DIETER DÖLLING, ET AL., META-ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON DETERRENCE IN 
PUNITIVITY INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 362 (Helmut Kury & Evelyn Shea eds., 2011). 
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Klick & Alexander Tabarrok, Police, Prisons, and Punishment: the Empirical Evidence on Crime 
Deterrence, HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME 127-143 (Bruce L. Benson & Paul R. 
Zimmerman eds., 2012); Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, Do Police Reduce Crime? 
Estimates Using the Allocation of Police Forces After a Terrorist Attack, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 115 
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policy possibly will have high social costs.  Namely, the law-abiding citizens 
might sense discomfort from having constant police presence.  On the other hand, 
increasing police force only to a limited extent might lead to a displacement 
effect.  In light of the current circumstances there is therefore a need to design an 
enforcement mechanism, which remains effective without a significant increase 
in the enforcement costs. 
This paper adopts the behavioral approach to law and economics 
(behavioral approach) in order to design a cost-effective apprehension system.  
The behavioral approach mainly discusses the cognitive biases, which people in 
general, and agents in the legal system in particular, are subject to in order to 
explain behavior.12  This paper takes one step forward and explores the ways to 
“utilize” those biases in order to improve criminal justice policy.  Although some 
scholars offer policy changes based on cognitive biases in other areas,13 this 
approach is rarely pursued in the criminal justice policy context.14 
Based on insights from the behavioral law and economics, this paper 
discusses detailed policy changes, which enhance the deterrence effect without 
significantly increasing the given resources.  In addition, it includes in-depth 
analysis of possible challenges of this policy and offers solutions.  The suggested 
policy consists of two steps. 
The first step is to introduce ambiguity into the probability of detection.  
This proposition is based on empirical evidence suggesting that people are averse 
to ambiguity, thus, in some circumstances they are deterred better by random 
probability of detection.15  One way to achieve this is, for example, by 
introducing random patrol projects.  To be precise, the police department ought 
to send police force patrols to problematic and “normal” areas on random dates.  
Inasmuch as those patrols are random, criminals would not be able to calculate 
the probability of detection.  Namely, if without these random patrols the 
criminal has the possibility to know his risk of being detected, the new 
enforcement system would make it impossible to anticipate the chances of being 
caught.  For instance, prior to this policy the criminal believes he has 20% chance 
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Residual Deterrence, 12 CRIME & JUST. 1, 12 (1990). 
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of being caught committing theft, whether based on clearance rates of previous 
years, or his and his acquaintances’ experience.  Following the introduction of 
the new random patrols, he will not be able to make any estimation. 
The second step of the policy is to make those random patrol projects 
salient and highly publicized.  This paper provides new evidence, based on a 
recently pursued survey in the area of tax policies in Italy, that potential violators 
have bounded rationality and limited knowledge of policy changes.  Forasmuch 
as the awareness of the criminal to the new random detection is crucial to its 
success, this paper suggests using the “availability heuristics” to increase this 
awareness.  According to the latter, saliency of an event, increases its perceived 
frequency.16  Thus, covering the random detection methods in the media, and 
publicizing them through other channels, would increase criminals’ awareness of 
the vague probability of apprehension.  This policy, in turn, might enhance the 
deterrent effect by making potential offenders to be aware they are acting in an 
entirely uncertain environment. 
The existing literature on ambiguity aversion, although briefly 
mentioning possible policy implications, does not investigate in depth the 
structured policy changes that would use ambiguity.  In addition, those studies do 
not discuss the bounded rationality of offenders, which makes them less 
informed.  Lack of awareness to the new policy of ambiguity might significantly 
impede its effectiveness in deterring crime, thus, this problem should be 
addressed.  This paper attempts to fill these gaps. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section I discusses the rational and 
the behavioral approaches to crime and presents empirical evidence for the 
importance of certainty of detection and punishment.  Section II presents the 
suggested changes to the detection policy.  Possible limitations are addressed in 
Section III.  Finally, some concluding remarks are offered. 
 
II.  RATIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL APPROACHES TO CRIME 
 
A.  The Deterrence Theory and Empirical Evidence to Support it 
 
The description of criminal behavior based on the rational choice theory 
was first offered by Gary Becker.17  The author suggested that criminals, as other 
enforcement actors, are rational and respond to incentives.18  Thus, by raising 
either the severity of the expected punishment or the probability of being 
punished, the enforcement authorities are able to alter the expected costs of 
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2015] ANY-WHERE ANY-TIME 31 
 
 
 
crime.19  In turn, this is expected to deter potential offenders from committing 
crimes.20 
A great deal of empirical studies have tested the abovementioned theory 
and shown that the deterrence effect largely exists.21  Although some scholars 
found supporting evidence for the effect of severity of punishment,22 most of the 
empirical literature on this issue suggests that the certainty of apprehension and 
punishment has the dominant effect on deterrence.23 
For instance, Michael Block and Vernon Gerety present an experimental 
study where they show, in accordance with the existing literature, that prisoners 
are more strongly deterred by increased probability of detection, while students 
respond more to the severity of punishment.24  A more recent study, by Horst 
Entorf, shows the importance of certainty of apprehension and punishment for 
the deterrence of criminals, exploiting the differences in the level of enforcement 
between the German Länder.25  The author presents evidence that the growing 
practice of dismissing cases by prosecutors results in weaker deterrence of 
crimes.26  The reason for that is this practice can be counted as lowering the 
certainty of punishment.27  Another important factor in deterring crime shown in 
the paper is a higher clearance rate.28  On the other hand, based on his findings, 
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the author concludes that the severity of punishment does not constitute a 
significant deterrent factor.29 
Moreover, a number of studies were able to isolate the effect of increased 
police protection on the number of committed crimes.30  Those studies show an 
important deterrent effect that is achieved by increasing the police presence and 
the probability of detection.31  Some of these studies exploit the changes in police 
presence, which resulted from terrorist attacks.32  Using empirical methods, the 
studies demonstrate a significant negative effect of police presence on crime.33  
Although the effect is investigated in different countries, the authors reach 
similar conclusions.  An additional study, by John MacDonald, Jonathan Klick, 
and Ben Grunwald, provides evidence for the long-term effect of an increased 
police protection on crime, across most crime categories.34  This is an important 
step in analyzing the crime control system since previous studies have not been 
able to demonstrate this effect and some even presented a positive correlation 
between crime rates and size of the police force.35 
The growing empirical literature supporting the effectiveness of police in 
deterring crime strengthens the rationale to use this kind of crime control policy.  
However, there are two main limitations of such policy.  First, increasing the 
presence of police in a significant manner imposes considerably high tangible 
costs on enforcement authorities.  All the more so, in the face of findings that 
suggest police presence has a merely local deterrent effect.36  The latter evidence 
implies that in order to achieve deterrence, policemen should essentially be 
placed everywhere.  The second limitation is that constant police presence might 
have high social costs.  Notwithstanding the fact people aspire to feel safe, they 
may not wish to be regularly under surveillance.  Increasing the police force on 
the streets might impede people’s sense of individual freedom and involuntarily 
restrict their self-expressive behavior.  Those non-monetary costs bear the risk of 
diminishing the legitimacy of such law enforcement policy. 
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34 See John M. MacDonald, Jonathan Klick, and Ben Grunwald, The Effect of Privately Provided 
Police Services on Crime, 4 (Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, Working Paper No. 430, 
2012). 
35 See Samuel Cameron, The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and Evidence, 
41 Kyklos 301, 315 (1988). 
36 See Di Tella & Schargrodsky, supra note 10, at 130.  In other words, the police force is not only 
costly, but also has a limited local effect, meaning that crimes might be transferred to other places, 
where there is no police presence, and impose additional costs of crime. 
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B.  Behavioral Approach to Crime 
 
In recent decades the model of the rational choice theory is being 
criticized by the behavioral approach.  Based on empirical evidence from the 
social sciences,37 scholars assert that people do not always act rationally in its 
standard meaning.  For instance, they point out other factors motivating decision 
makers aside from self-maximization goals.38  Forasmuch as human behavior 
deviates from the rational choice model, not taking those factors into account 
turns the classical model into a normative statement rather than a positive 
description.  Thus, the predictable power of this model is called into question.39 
An important area for the law and economics analysis where social 
scientists find deviations from the rational choice theory is the decision making 
under uncertainty process.  A great deal of empirical evidence has demonstrated 
that while calculating probabilities, persons systematically use rules-of-thumbs 
based on life experience.40  People have bounded rationality rather than acting as 
perfectly rational individuals with complete information.41 
Nevertheless, the behavioral approach does not argue that people are 
unpredictable agents who make random mistakes.  On the contrary, behavioral 
proponents believe the decision makers are subject to systematic biases, which 
makes it possible to predict and even to model their behavior.42  As described by 
Dan Ariely, “these irrational behaviors of ours are neither random nor senseless.  
They are systematic, and since we repeat them again and again, predictable.”43  
Consequently, the purpose of the behavioral approach is not to undermine the 
economic framework, but to strengthen its predictive and analytical power.44 
The behavioral approach to law and economics was applied to criminal 
law as well.  In this context, neither the criminals nor other criminal justice 
players are believed to act fully rationally.45  Nonetheless, similarly to rational 
choice proponents, behavioral scholars believe that potential criminals respond to 
incentives and take into account, at least roughly, the costs and benefits of their 
crimes.46  The assumption, however, is that the estimations on which they base 
                                                                                                                                    
 
37 See generally John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 669, 669 (1996). 
38 See id. at 673; Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 14, at 1473. 
39 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1175; Jolls, Sustein, & Thaler, supra note 14, at 1473-74. 
40 See AMOS TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 
3-20 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982). 
41 See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99, 101 (1955). 
42 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 
47 Econometrica 263, 284 (1979). 
43 DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL xx (2009). 
44 See Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 14, at 1476. 
45 See generally McAdams & Ulen, supra note 12, at 2. 
46 See Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 14, at 1538. 
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their decisions are subject to heuristics and biases.47  Thus, the following sections 
examine the ways in which policy makers may use those biases in order to design 
an efficient and less costly detection policy. 
 
1.  Ambiguity Aversion 
 
The distinction between risk and uncertainty (the latter named in this 
paper as “ambiguity”) can be traced back to Frank Knight.48  Whereas in the 
former the probabilities of the occurrence of an event are known, and the 
uncertainty only applies to the outcome, in the latter, the precise likelihoods are 
not given.  For instance, a toss of a coin is a risky event since there is a 
probability of 50% chance of heads or tails.  On the contrary, deciding on which 
player to place a bet on in a tennis game is an ambiguous decision if the decision-
maker has no prior knowledge about the previous performance of both players.  
The reason for this is that it is difficult to assign any probability that player A or 
B would win without knowing his and his opponent’s prior game records. 
Ambiguity aversion is an empirically well-established phenomenon.  The 
best-known experiment is that of Daniel Ellsberg (Ellsberg Paradox).49  The 
experiment is designed in the following way.  People are presented with two 
urns, A and B, which contain black and red balls.  Following this, they are asked 
about their preferences regarding the urn and the ball.  They are offered $100 if 
the drawn ball is the one they bet on.  The subjects are told that urn A contains 
100 balls, yet the proportions of red and black balls are not known and can range 
from zero red balls and 100 black balls, and vice versa.  In urn B there are 50 
black balls and 50 red balls.  The majority of people prefer to bet on balls from 
urn B, regardless whether they bet on a red or a black ball.50  If the subjects’ 
choice reflects their perception of probabilities, for them the probability of a red 
ball from urn B is higher than the probability of a red ball from urn A.  At the 
same time however, the results suggest that the probability of drawing a black 
ball from urn B is also higher than the probability of drawing a black ball from 
                                                                                                                                    
 
47 See generally McAdams & Ulen, supra note 12, at 4-5.  See Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement 
with Boundary Rational Actors, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOUR 
(Francesco Parisi and Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005), 268-286; Frans van Winder & Elliott Ash, On 
the Behavioral Economics of Crime, CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS AND 
POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING 10 (2009), http://dare.uva.nl/document/181782.  A close stream of 
literature to the behavioral approach is criminology.  They as well deviate from the rational model 
of behavior.  However, similarly to behavioral scholars, they believe criminals react to incentives.  
See Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 
CRIME AND JUSTICE 1, 6-8 (1998) (showing that if criminals perceive the risk of sanction as high, 
they tend to commit less crimes.  In other words, although this discipline relies on the perceptual 
deterrence rather than the actual, it still shows a deterrence effect). 
48 FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921). 
49 Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON. 643 (1961). 
50 Id. at 650-51. 
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urn A.51  This choice is confusing since it implies that P(BB)+P(RB) >1, where 
P(BB) is the probability to draw a black ball from urn B, and P(RB) is the 
probability to draw a red ball from urn B.52  Those results suggest that people are 
averse to ambiguous choices.53 
Following Ellsberg’s finding, many scholars conducted experiments 
seeking to replicate his results.  Those attempts demonstrate ambiguity aversion 
in different contexts and thus, increase its validity.54  The effect of ambiguity 
aversion is shown in the context of losses as well as gains.55  Moreover, some 
studies present evidence that people not only refrain from choosing an 
ambiguous choice, but they are even willing to pay a premium to avoid this 
choice.56 
Furthermore, the notion of “boundary effect” was developed.  That is to 
say, the perception changes on the “edges” of the probability.  For instance, when 
facing losses, ambiguous low probabilities are over-weighted and ambiguous 
high probabilities are underweighted.57  Thus, people tend to express ambiguity-
averse behavior when dealing with low probabilities, and ambiguity–seeking 
behavior when dealing with high probabilities.58  Kip Viscusi and Harrell 
Chesson calculated empirically the “mean crossover point,” where people turn 
from ambiguity averse to ambiguity seeking, to be somewhere between 0.40-
0.49.59  To be precise, when people face an ambiguous loss, yet estimate the 
probability to be lower than 40% they will exert ambiguity-averse behavior.60  
Analogically, whereas individuals estimate the probability of occurrence to be 
higher than 49%, they will tend to employ ambiguity-seeking behavior.61  Those 
results imply that ambiguity induces more compliance where the deterrence is 
weak (low probabilities of detection), and less compliance where the deterrence 
is strong (high probabilities of detection).  This evidence is reassuring since most 
                                                                                                                                    
 
51 Id. 
52 If there are a total of 100 balls, red and black, then the bets are mutually exclusive.  Thus, the 
perception of P(BB) > P(BA) should be followed by the assumption that P(RB) < P(RA). 
53 Ellsberg, supra note 49, at 650-51. 
54 See Colin Camerer & Martin Weber, Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: 
Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 5 J. OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 325, 360 (1992). 
55 See generally Gideon Keren & Leonie E.M. Gerritsen, On the Robustness and Possible Accounts 
of Ambiguity Aversion, 103 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 149, 155 (1999). 
56 See Selwyn W. Becker & Fred O. Brownson, What Price Ambiguity? or the Role of Ambiguity in 
Decision-Making, 72 J. POL. ECON. 62, 73 (1964). 
57 See Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Decision Making under Ambiguity, 59 J. OF BUS. 225, 
247 (1986) (discussing a mirror situation as well, i.e. when people face gains they tend to over-
estimate ambiguous low probabilities and under-estimate ambiguous high probabilities). 
58 Id. at 245. 
59 W. Kip Viscusi & Harrell Chesson, Hopes and Fears: The Conflicting Effects of Risk Ambiguity, 
47 THEORY & DECISION 153, 173 (1999). 
60 Id. 
61 See id. 
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of the crimes, which might be deterred by the following suggested means, have a 
low rate of detection.62 
Whereas those findings are explored in the literature regarding the 
enforcement of tax evasion,63 its empirical investigation and application in the 
enforcement of other crimes are limited.  A handful of studies suggest using 
ambiguity in the context of probability of detection and offer some empirical 
evidence to support their suggestions.64 
Lawrence Sherman examines “crackdowns” (i.e. an increase in policing 
in certain areas for certain periods) in the U.S. during the 1980s and offers some 
suggestive evidence of a successful deterrence.65  The author demonstrates that 
sometimes the deterrence effect remains even after the ‘crackdown’ terminates, 
and names this effect “residual deterrence.”  Based on that, the author suggests 
that using short-period “crackdowns” in different places and times might be a 
cost-efficient policy.66 
More than a decade later, Tom Baker, Alon Harel and Tamar Kugler 
tested empirically the efficiency of ambiguity as a deterrence effect.67  They 
pursued it by conducting a laboratory experiment with payoffs and the possibility 
for an action that might result in a fine.68  In this experiment the subjects were 
facing two options: Option A, in which they receive only the payoff for 
participation, or Option B, where they could receive an additional payment, yet, 
with the risk of paying a fine if detected choosing this option.  An important fact 
is that Option B had higher expected value than Option A.  Option B had 
different structures of uncertainty regarding the penalty and the probability of 
being punished.  Some of the options were risky (i.e. unknown outcome, yet 
known probabilities), whereas others were ambiguous (i.e. the precise probability 
of being caught was unknown).  The authors found that participants were better 
deterred by the ambiguous option of detection (or uncertain size of punishment) 
than by the risky one.69  To be precise, when facing an ambiguous detection 
probability, subjects had a tendency to prefer Option A to B even though the 
                                                                                                                                    
 
62 See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. 
63 See generally Michael W. Spicer & J. Everett Thomas, Audit Probabilities and the Tax Evasion 
Decision: An Experimental Approach, 2 J. ECON. PSYCH. 241, 241 (1982); Jeff T. Casey & John T. 
Scholz, Boundary Effects of Vague Risk Information on Taxpayer Decisions, 50 ORGAN. BEHAV. 
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65 See Sherman, supra note 15, at 1. 
66 See id. at 11-12. 
67 See Baker, Harel, & Kugler, supra note 15, at 445. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. at 466. 
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latter had a higher expected value.  Furthermore, this effect was stronger when 
the uncertainty was greater.70 
Similarly, Thomas Loughran and others used, in a recent study, data 
from the Pathways to Desistance Study to follow the independent71 effect of 
ambiguity on young offenders.72  The authors found that for instrumental crimes73 
and lower perceived probability of detection (below 0.3), criminals are deterred 
by a stronger ambiguity.  Namely, when the offenders perceived the probability 
of being detected as low, yet, could not estimate precisely this probability, they 
tended to commit fewer crimes.74  The main significance of this research lies in 
the chosen sample.  Whereas the majority of the empirical studies demonstrate 
the phenomenon of ambiguity aversion on the general population, this research 
presents evidence that ambiguity has a negative effect also on actual criminals. 
Another important caveat of the abovementioned study is that ambiguity 
has a deterrent effect when the perceived risk of being arrested is low.75  Crimes 
that are expected to be most affected by introducing ambiguity into probability of 
detection are “street crimes.”  The latter usually are property crimes,76 and those 
are the crimes that can be deterred by police patrols.  Property crimes often have 
low actual probability of detection.  For instance, the German clearance rate of 
serious theft was around thirteen percent between the years 1998 - 2001, as 
compared to aggravated assault clearance rate, which was around eighty-five 
percent.77  Criminology literature assists to identify the correlation between the 
actual and the perceived probability of detection and suggests that criminals 
update upwards their probability of apprehension after being arrested.78  
                                                                                                                                    
 
70 See id. at 453-54. 
71 See Loughran et al., supra note 15, at 1034, n.4 (examining the effect of ambiguity as 
independent from the effect of probability of detection). 
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mentioning is that the strength of updating depends how many crimes the criminal managed to 
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Therefore, if only thirteen percent of criminals are arrested for their crimes, the 
majority of property crimes offenders might have low perceived probability of 
detection.  Consequently, the results, which support a “boundary effect,” imply 
that street crimes might be deterred by ambiguous detection policing. 
The aforementioned studies offer empirical support for the deterrence 
effect of ambiguous probability of detection in the context of “regular” crimes.  
The following sections discuss detailed policy changes to introduce ambiguity 
into probability of detection.  Furthermore, some evidence is presented to 
illustrate bounded rationality of potential violators.  Forasmuch as awareness is 
an integral part of the ambiguity policy, methods to increase the saliency of the 
changed policy are analyzed. 
 
III.  ANY-WHERE ANY-TIME: TOWARDS A NEW POLICY 
 
A.  Randomization of the Detection Strategies 
 
When police operate in a certain way, there is a pattern that the potential 
criminal can learn.  It does not mean that police enforce crimes in completely 
predictable ways (e.g. patrolling in a specific place at the same day and the same 
hour), rather it refers to the fact that the crime monitoring techniques are based 
on some rationales which can be learned.  With such policy, criminals are able to 
acquire information on the areas and times that are riskier in terms of being 
caught and the methods used by police for detection.79  Thus, they are facing an 
uncertain environment of being arrested, yet they can estimate the risk, and try to 
minimize it by selecting where and when to commit crimes.  The general 
presumption is that criminals are risk seeking,80 thus, a mere probability of being 
detected, as long as it is not high, does not have a sufficient deterrent effect. 
On the contrary, based on the empirical evidence reviewed in the 
previous section, eliminating the predictability of police work and turning the 
likelihood of being detected to ambiguous, might change criminals’ behavior.  
The suggestion is to keep investigating crimes based on existing evidence, 
however, in addition, to create a very ambiguous and hectic environment in 
which the criminals are operating.  This proposal stems from the distinction 
between monitoring and investigating methods.  In the former, the enforcement 
authorities invest money in crime control prior to the offender’s action, mainly to 
prevent crimes.81  In the latter, the police invest resources to collect evidence and 
                                                                                                                                    
commit prior to being arrested.  The lower the ratio of arrests to the number of committed crimes, 
the weaker is the updating strength of the current arrest.  Id. 
79 See Loughran et al., supra note 15, at 1046 (presenting evidence that while criminals’ perception 
of risk is increasing, the perception of ambiguity is decreasing, and suggesting that, with time, 
criminals gain more experience and can predict better their risks of being detected). 
80 See generally Becker, supra note 6, at 169. 
81 See Dilip Mookherjee & I. P. L. Png, Monitoring vis-à-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law, 
82 AM. ECON. REV. 556, 556 (1992). 
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solve crimes which have been previously committed.82  Inasmuch as both 
methods are important in challenging crime, this paper does not offer to replace 
investigation, but to improve monitoring.  The suggestions for the policy changes 
are as follows. 
First, it is suggested to use deliberately random police patrols.83  Namely, 
the idea is to send police cars or police on foot to patrol in diverse areas, on 
different days.  Those patrolling projects will also vary in the overall duration 
(e.g. for several consecutive days, a week, etc.).  These police campaigns or 
crackdowns are common in the U.S., yet quite rare in the EU.  The goal of this 
mechanism should be the creation of ambiguous perceived probability rather than 
occasionally targeting specific crimes or places due to a contemporary need.  
Since the agents who will be making the patrolling schedule might be 
unconsciously tempted to create a certain pattern, the schedule may be selected 
randomly by specifically designed computer software, once a week or once a 
month.  Under these circumstances, the potential criminals will not be able to 
learn the patterns of police work, since there will not be any pattern to learn.  
Thus, not being able to calculate the risk of operating in a certain area, at a 
certain time, might enhance the deterrent effect. 
An additional possible benefit of this kind of policy is the reduction of 
the “displacement effect.”  According to the latter, when some crime prevention 
measures are taken in a certain area, criminals merely displace their activity to 
other areas.84  Consequently, in terms of overall welfare there are no benefits to 
society, inasmuch as the same quantity of crimes is committed in a different 
place.  Therefore, increasing constant police presence in specific areas is not only 
costly, but might displace the crime to other locations.  On the contrary, sending 
random patrols to variant places for different time periods might avoid this effect.  
The reason is that potential criminals would not be able to know which areas are 
more risky for them.  Thus, it will not seem beneficial to prefer one area to the 
other, and displace their criminal activity. 
Bearing the above-mentioned in mind, more problematic areas should 
receive to a certain degree more police attention, even if randomly.  This 
suggestion is relying on the concept of “targeted enforcement.”85  According to 
the latter, when enforcement costs are limited, it is efficient to increase the 
probability of apprehension for violators who did not comply with the law in the 
past.86  Similarly, in the current context, places with generally higher crime rates 
                                                                                                                                    
 
82 See id. 
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should receive higher proportion of policing.  For this purpose, police statistics of 
reported crimes may be used to identify those “hot spots.”87  Nevertheless, police 
patrols should also be sent, albeit in smaller dosages, to less dubious locations in 
order to prevent the displacement effect.  Thus, the proportion of patrols will be 
higher in more problematic areas, yet within those patrols the randomness will be 
kept.  This element is important in order to maintain the unpredictability of the 
patrols and so not to create a particular pattern of work that can be identified. 
The second suggestion concerns a later period of the policy.  After a 
certain time frame where the police patrol would be patrolling with uniform, 
undercover policing will be introduced.88  This new change, as the rest of the 
policy, should be announced and brought to the attention of the potential 
criminals.  From that point onwards, not only would the patrols themselves be 
random, but also the usage of uniform will be irregular.  It is suggested however, 
to use to a lower extent undercover police since visibility by itself might have a 
deterrence effect.89  This adds another element of ambiguity.  In those 
circumstances, the potential criminal is not only uncertain about the places and 
time where he can be caught, but also about the person who can apprehend him.  
In extreme cases it can even create a feeling that a potential victim might be a 
policeman.  Consequently, this increased ambiguity might have a stronger 
deterrent effect. 
It should be stressed that both police in uniform and without uniform 
would be allowed to act only within the limits of the law in each country.  For 
instance, in criminal justice systems where there is a constraint on police 
intervention, they are granted the authority to stop, question, search, and arrest 
people only in those circumstances where there is a reasonable suspicion that a 
person is a potential or actual offender.90  This limitation would reassure one that 
law abiding people will not be harassed unnecessarily and harmed by the new 
policy. 
Third, this paper suggests installing cameras91 in different areas (only 
public locations).  However, assuming activation of cameras imposes costs as 
                                                                                                                                    
 
87 “Hot spots” are areas in which the rate of public disorder and crime is among the highest.  Those 
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well, it is offered to activate them randomly in different areas on different days.  
Alternatively, the new WCCTV cameras can be used.  Those are movable, cost-
efficient cameras, which do not require an infrastructure, thus, reducing the costs 
of installation.92  They can be quickly deployed at any location and moved to a 
different location at any time.  This will introduce another element of ambiguity 
and randomize the monitoring enforcement methods while reducing the costs of 
operating the cameras.  Furthermore, it might have the effect of police patrols, 
thus, enabling to cover wider range of areas. 
The above measures should be combined with high publicity of the 
ambiguity to overcome people’s bounded rationality and to intensify its effect as 
explained in the following sections. 
 
B.  Policy and Awareness 
 
Merely changing the policy of detection to more ambiguous is 
insufficient for deterrence.  One of the criticisms that can be found in the 
criminology literature regarding crime control policies is that without a proper 
link between the rule and the awareness of criminals, offenders are resistant to 
policy changes.93  As discussed in section two, people have bounded rationality 
and do not possess complete information.  Thus, criminals might not really 
recognize changes in the enforcement policy.  The following survey illustrates 
this problem. 
 
1.  The Example of the Tax Rule in Italy 
 
Tax evasion is a common problem in some countries with Italy being in a 
forefront on that matter.94  One of the targeted groups for the tax authorities is the 
shopkeepers.  The cost of monitoring are high since sellers may simply refrain 
from issuing receipts, thus, presenting to the tax authorities a lower income than 
actual.  In order to solve this problem and incentivize merchants to issue tax 
receipts, in 1983 the Italian government introduced a new law.95  According to 
this law, sellers who failed to provide a receipt after each sale faced a fine.96  
Moreover, in an innovative step, an additional provision was introduced which 
obligated the consumers to ask for a receipt after completing their purchase.97  In 
other words, if a buyer purchased a good and left the shop without a receipt, the 
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authorities could impose a fine on the buyer (hereinafter: “The Tax Policy”).98  
This law was enforced - with low probability - by the Guardia di Finanza (Fiscal 
Police).99  Through the years the law was reformed and eventually abolished in 
2003.100 
 
2.  The Survey 
 
The uniqueness of the abovementioned violation (relevant to buyers) is 
that anyone in the population is a potential violator.  Forasmuch as most people, 
if not all, purchase goods during the course of their life, the law requiring 
consumers to ask for a receipt has a wide applicability.  Therefore, investigating 
the awareness of the ordinary population regarding this tax policy and its changes 
may be considered as having an external validity. 
The purpose of the survey was to assess whether Italian citizens were 
aware of the introduction of the tax policy and whether they knew this policy was 
abolished in 2003.  To this end, two surveys in the Italian language were 
prepared and distributed between two samples of the Italian population.  The 
surveys included ten questions, some referring to general characteristics, whereas 
others are questions of interest.  The first question of interest refers to the 
awareness of the respondents to the fact that the tax policy was abolished 
(question number four).  The second question of interest examines whether 
people knew of the introduction of the policy in the first place (question ten).  
Other questions explore the source of information, whether people 
comply/complied with the law, their knowledge regarding apprehended violators, 
and whether they knew what the expected punishment for this violation was.  For 
the full questionnaires, see Appendix B. 
One of the two main questions of interest (question four) differs between 
the two surveys in order to assure the results are independent of the formulation 
of the question.  In the first survey (Survey One), the main question of interest is 
as follows, “According to the current Italian law, are buyers in Italy obliged to 
take a receipt after making a purchase of any kind?”  In the second survey 
(Survey Two), the question is formulated in the following way, “According to the 
current Italian law, are CONSUMERS obliged to ask for a receipt after making a 
purchase of any kind?”  The two samples differ in the characteristics of the 
respondents (for summary statistics see Table A1 in Appendix A). 
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3.  Results 
 
The results demonstrate lack of awareness mainly with regard to the 
abolishment of the tax policy, but also of its initial introduction as well.101  In 
Survey One, around eighty-four percent of the respondents were either not aware 
the tax policy was introduced or that it was abolished.102  Moreover, seventy-two 
percent of the respondents, who believed the tax policy exists nowadays, stated 
they are still complying103 with this policy. 
The results in Survey Two are mostly analogous to Survey One.  About 
eighty-three percent of the respondents either stated the tax policy currently 
exists or that it was never introduced.104  Furthermore, seventy-eight percent of 
those who were not aware of the abolishment of the tax policy suggested they 
currently comply with it.105 
Interestingly, the results demonstrate that media is an important source of 
information regarding the existence of the tax policy in both surveys.  
Furthermore, the results suggest the respondents are quite well informed 
regarding the prescribed punishment for this violation (for the complete results of 
the two surveys see Table A1 in Appendix A). 
 
4.  Limitations 
 
The two samples are not randomly depicted from the Italian population 
hence it might be argued that they are not representative of the entire population.  
Nevertheless, there is still some variation in age, levels of education, and living 
area of the respondents.  Furthermore, the discussed tax policy is relevant to all 
the respondents in the two samples, as much as it is relevant to the general Italian 
population.  Therefore, it is asserted that those results have an application beyond 
the sample. 
 
5.  Discussion 
 
The results of the survey are striking and suggest, contrary to the rational 
choice theory, that potential violators might indeed have bounded rationality.  To 
be precise, the abovementioned results suggest people are not perfectly informed 
of policy changes made by the authorities.  In the example of the Italian tax 
policy, the majority of the respondents are not aware that the policy, which 
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threatens them with a fine, no longer exists.  Some of those people not only lack 
the awareness, but also in fact comply with a non-existent law. 
Inasmuch as the suggested policy in this paper targets offenders’ 
awareness of the ambiguity, it is of outmost importance to guarantee they are 
familiar with the changes in the enforcement methods.  Otherwise, the 
introduction of ambiguity might have little or no effect on crime.  For this reason, 
and following the presented findings of the survey, the current section discusses 
the availability heuristics and the ways to increase criminals’ awareness of the 
suggested policy, which in turn is expected to intensify its effect. 
 
6.  Increasing Awareness through Availability Heuristics 
 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman discussed the rules-of-thumb 
people use while judging frequencies and probabilities.106  The world is uncertain 
and people often face the need to assess the probability or frequency of an 
event.107  Since on the one hand, there is a great deal of information which needs 
to be processed and, on the other hand, not all the relevant information is 
available, people use life experience in order to develop mechanisms to cope 
with this reality.  For instance, people know that it is easier to recollect high 
frequency events compared to rare events.108  In addition, more likely events are 
perceived as easier to imagine.  Lastly, there is a stronger associative connection 
when two events frequently occur together.109 
The abovementioned experiences lead to the rule-of-thumb of 
“availability” – the assessed frequency or likelihood of an event depends on the 
simplicity with which it can be retrieved from one’s mind.  Although useful, 
availability is not always a valid tool since it is influenced by other factors that 
might be unrelated to the actual frequency of an event.  Hence, the usage of this 
short cut leads to systematic biases.  For instance, a person might assess the 
frequency of divorce based on the rate of divorce among his acquaintances.  Not 
surprisingly, this estimation might be different from the actual frequency and 
only by chance is this person acquainted with a great deal of divorced couples.110 
The availability heuristics has an effect in many areas of life, and has 
already been analyzed in the context of criminal law.111  The behavioral approach 
does not follow the concept that potential criminals are fully rational and make 
decisions based on complete and accurate information.112  Still, it is rather 
accepted that offenders make some calculations of expected costs and benefits of 
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crime.  However, due to their bounded rationality, potential criminals might 
assess the probability of the expected punishment based on the availability of the 
relevant information to them.  Inevitably, this information may be not related to 
the actual probability and thus, lead to mistaken judgment.113 
Nonetheless, the abovementioned biases are believed to be systematic as 
opposed to random.  Thus, Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler suggest making 
enforcement policy more visible.114  For instance, instead of using small and less 
costly parking tickets, they offer to place noticeable colored parking tickets with 
the word “VIOLATION” on side window shields.115  They assert that this kind of 
policy would deter forbidden parking more efficiently by making the punishment 
very visible and available for others to see.116  In addition, they suggest using 
“community police” who will be patrolling streets by walking rather than 
driving.117  This makes the police more visible, and as a result might deter 
potential criminals without altering the actual probability of detection.118 
In this paper it is suggested to make visible and salient the randomness of 
the detection rather than its probability per se.  The problem in manipulating the 
perceived probability of detection lies in the famous question presented by 
Gordon Tullock: “Can you fool all of the people all of the time?”119  This kind of 
policy might have a too short-term effect.  Since the actual probability is held 
constant, not much time will pass before the potential criminals would realize 
what is made available to them is not a representation of the actual risk of 
apprehension and, all the more so, in light of the known learning process people 
are going through in new circumstances.  The latter would assist potential 
offenders to update their perceived probability of apprehension and cease 
responding to the manipulation. 
Thus, it is suggested not to merely deceive offenders regarding the state 
of the world but to create an environment in which they are not capable of 
estimating their apprehension probabilities, and make them constantly aware of 
this.  This might be achieved by publicizing the measures presented in Section 
III.A, and stressing the fact that unlike before, those measures are used in a 
random manner without a concrete pattern and that any offender can be 
apprehended at any time.  It might even be useful to give this policy a “catchy” 
name such as “any-where any-time” policy that might be better kept in mind and 
in turn, more easily recollected. 
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Furthermore, the publicity should be made through all possible channels 
to cover a higher percentage of the criminal population.  Namely, different forms 
of media should be used, short “advertisements” on television, in newspapers, 
whether online or in print, billboards on the roads, in public transportation 
stations, etc.  In addition, occasionally some arrests should be publicized to 
emphasize that this policy actually detects criminals.  The role of the press in 
people’s awareness is captivatingly described by Bernard Cohen: “It may not be 
successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly 
successful in telling its readers what to think about.”120  Therefore, the new policy 
would be thought and spoken about and would consequently reach criminals’ 
consciousness directly and indirectly through hearing people talking about it on 
the streets. 
Since the media might have different interests than law enforcement 
authorities, the latter should become “availability entrepreneurs.”  Availability 
entrepreneurs are people or organizations that are using the availability heuristics 
to promote their interests, such as firms in the private sector or lobbyists trying to 
advance certain regulations.  One famous example of promotion of laws using 
the availability heuristics is the Love Canal example.121  With the help of an 
“availability entrepreneur” who used media and political pressure, a law was 
passed, state budget was wasted, and negligible environmental problems became 
a number one hazard.122  This anecdotal example demonstrates the powerful 
effect availability has on human behavior.123 
Another somewhat different example is the lobbying strategy of the new 
Supreme Court of Mexico established in 1994.  In order to restore people’s trust 
in the government, the Mexican officials made extensive reforms to the judicial 
system.124  As a result of lack of media coverage, however, society was not 
properly aware of the reforms and kept perceiving the Supreme Court as 
submissive to the executive power and inaccessible to most people.125  In order to 
correct this perception and enable promotion of Court’s interests, the latter 
pursued a publicizing strategy to raise the awareness of people to the new 
reforms.126  This was done through the Court’s own Office of Public Relations 
(DCS).127  The latter was advertising announcements regarding the court’s 
autonomy, and publishing books, leaflets, comics, and videos of the Court’s most 
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prominent decisions.128  Furthermore, the DCS issued routine press releases on 
pending and resolved cases.129  Some suggestive evidence demonstrates the 
success of this approach in promoting further judicial reforms.130 
Therefore, this paper suggests that it might be efficient for enforcement 
authorities to act as “availability entrepreneurs,” through its own Public Relation 
Office for example.  The latter will ensure raised awareness of potential 
offenders to the new “any-where any-time” policy.  This in turn, would intensify 
the effect of ambiguity-aversion and increase deterrence. 
 
IV.  POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS 
 
Even if criminals are indeed averse to ambiguity, there are some possible 
limitations of the policy that are addressed in the following sections. 
 
A.  Limited Expected Scope of Effect 
 
The suggested policy is expected to affect “street crimes” rather than all 
crimes.  Namely, crimes that are usually committed indoor most probably will 
not be deterred by these policy changes. 
There are a number of possible replies to this limitation.  First, many of 
the street crimes are property crimes (e.g. car theft, theft from car, burglaries, 
etc.).  In many countries property crimes constitute a large portion of total 
crimes.131  For instance, in Germany in 2002, around 50% of all reported crimes 
were theft.132  Thus, a policy that has the potential to deter this type of offense 
may reduce significant costs of crime. 
Second, this paper suggests that a policy which targets different groups 
of crimes with different methods rather than offering a unified policy for all 
crimes might be more efficient.  The rationale behind this suggestion is that 
different groups of crimes have special characteristics.133  In turn, the 
responsiveness to law enforcement of criminals from these groups varies.  Thus, 
instead of attempting to capture all criminals with one policy, it might be more 
efficient to think of different policies for different crimes. 
                                                                                                                                    
 
128 Id. at 9. 
129 Id. at 8-9. 
130 Id. at 10. 
131 In the US, in 2012, around 13,111,940 people reported being victims of property crimes.  This 
may be compared to 3,575,900 people who reported being victims of violent crimes or 1,271,770 
victims of serious violent crimes.  See Jennifer L. Truman & Lynn Langton, Criminal 
Victimization, 2013, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 4 (2014). 
132 Cornelius Nestler, Sentencing in Germany, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 114 (2003). 
133 Chambliss, supra note 73, at 712-17. 
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For instance, Isaac Ehrlich discusses in his paper the efficiency of 
discriminating penalties.134  He asserts that since some groups of criminals cannot 
be deterred, enforcement authorities should incapacitate them rather than trying 
to deter them.135  On the other hand, offenders who are responsive to enforcement 
should be dealt with using methods that are meant to deter crime.136 
 
B.  Existing Level of Ambiguity 
 
Some scholars assert that there is already an element of ambiguity in the 
enforcement system.  Thus, the question arises, what is the contribution in 
introducing the ambiguity using the measures described in the previous section? 
In order to offer a possible response to this limitation, different examples 
where ambiguity already exists should be examined.  Anat Horovitz and Uzi 
Segal review some of those existing policies.137  First, the most famous 
mechanisms used to create uncertainty are fake cameras and dummy police cars 
in the area of traffic control.138  This is indeed a useful mechanism in order to 
create ambiguity in the detection probability, however, it is limited to traffic 
control and does not extend to the “street crime” control.  The second example is 
random searches at airports.139  The authors present this policy as an illustration 
for the existing ambiguity, yet they explain that the deterrence achieved “by 
inspecting people and goods according to their ‘assessed level of risk,’ which is 
based on factors undisclosed to the public.”140  The fact that the authorities do not 
disclose their assessment techniques does not make the policy random.  Once the 
enforcement authorities target suspects by “assessed level of risk,” there is a 
pattern that might be evaluated by the potential “offender” and remove the 
ambiguity element from the searches.  Consequently, those searches will remain 
random only for the “innocents” who are not interested in understanding the 
undisclosed techniques.  The third example is random tax auditing.  Nevertheless, 
the authors do not assert it is random, rather they say that the tax authorities audit 
only a certain portion of all tax returns.141  Therefore, whereas tax audits usually 
have low probability, it is not necessarily random. 
The above analysis demonstrates that although there is already an 
attempt to increase ambiguity of the enforcement methods, it is usually restricted 
to specific areas.  Furthermore, from the description of “crackdowns” by 
                                                                                                                                    
 
134 See Isaac Ehrlich, On the Usefulness of Controlling Individuals: An Economic Analysis of 
Rehabilitation, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 307 (1981). 
135 Id. at 314-16. 
136 Id. at 319. 
137 See Anat Horovitz and Uzi Segal, The Ambiguous Nature of Ambiguity and Crime Control, 2 
NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 541, 542 (2007). 
138 Id. at 555. 
139 Id. at 555 nn.28-29. 
140 Id. at 555 n.28 
141 Id. 
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Sherman,142 it seems that the police campaigns have a pattern as well and they 
cannot be accounted as truly random.  Moreover, studies on the ambiguity 
aversion demonstrate that the higher the ambiguity, the stronger is the ambiguity 
aversion.143  Therefore, it is suggested that creating or increasing the level of 
ambiguity in the detection policy using the described instruments might increase 
the deterrence effect. 
 
C.  Learning Process 
 
Offenders, as other people, are going through a learning process in which 
they adjust to new circumstances.  Thus, possible counterargument to the 
suggested policy might be that even if offenders are currently ambiguity averse, 
in time they will adjust to the new methods and the deterrent effect will diminish. 
Nevertheless, this argument holds for any enforcement policy, even for 
the current one.  If indeed offenders go through a learning process, this implies 
that they are already fully adjusted to the existing policy of detection.  Thus, 
changing the current policy may improve the deterrence by introducing new 
circumstances to which the offenders still have not adjusted. 
 
D.  Possible Infringement of Civil Rights 
 
Another possible challenge to the suggested policy might be that it will 
infringe upon the civil rights of law-abiding people.  In addition, publicizing such 
a policy may create a feeling of “state-police” and restrict people’s self-
expressing behavior.  This, in turn, might lead to a loss of trust in the 
enforcement authorities. 
There are a number of possible responses to this concern.  First, the 
suggested policy is analyzed for application in countries with a democratic 
regime.  Those countries usually have strong safeguards of civil and human 
rights.  Thus, a proper system of checks and balances will be in force.  
Furthermore, an informal body is already active in many of those countries, i.e. 
Ombudsman,144 enabling civilians to file complains on police misconduct.  For 
instance, if minorities experience discrimination or harassment by police officers 
under this policy, these victims may file a complaint to the Ombudsman. 
In addition, the police will be acting within the existing limits of power 
and under the rule of law.  For instance, in countries where only those who 
exhibit suspicious behavior are followed by police intervention, these same 
                                                                                                                                    
 
142 See Sherman, supra note 15. 
143 Viscusi & Chesson, supra note 59, at 155; see also Camerer & Weber, supra note 54, at 325-26. 
144 GABRIELE KUCSKO-STADLMAYER, EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN-INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL ANALYSIS REGARDING THE MULTI-FACETED REALISATION OF AN IDEA,1-167 (Gabriele 
Kucsko-Stadlmayer ed., 2008). 
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people will also be the only ones to be addressed under the new policy.  Police 
will not be allowed to interrupt the lives of law-abiding people.  Thus, the new 
policy, which will monitor people randomly, is not expected to infringe civil 
rights more than the current policy.  Consequently, as people will not be harassed 
in vain, there probably will not be a loss of trust in the enforcement authorities. 
A second possible response is that for law-abiding people the current 
regime is already random.  As discussed before, offenders might know the 
pattern of police work inasmuch as it concerns their risk of being detected.  They 
are incentivized to learn the patterns of police force and reduce the uncertainty of 
committing crime.  On the contrary, law-abiding citizens usually do not spend 
time studying the patterns of police work.  They also do not learn it passively by 
being arrested.  For this part of the society, as long as police are not present 
everywhere, their presence is random.  Consequently, introducing ambiguity into 
the probability of detection by converting police monitoring work to random 
activity should only affect criminals. 
 
E.  Legitimacy 
 
A similar, albeit separate, counterargument for the suggested policy is 
the possible lack of legitimacy in randomizing police work.  For instance, in the 
U.S. the tax authorities, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), introduced random 
auditing.145  Under the new policy, people were audited at random rather than 
according to some calculations that chose suspicious people for auditing.146  
Honest taxpayers challenged the legitimacy of this kind of policy due to the 
inconvenience of being audited.147  In addition, their argument was that instead of 
following an efficient “formula” which selects suspicious people for auditing, 
law-abiding people were harassed by the IRS authorities.148 
As mentioned previously, the suggested policy addresses the monitoring 
methods, while offering to keep the investigating methods intact.  Namely, police 
will continue investigating committed crimes based on existing evidence 
(“formula”), thus, not disregarding actual suspects.  Whereas regarding the 
legitimacy of making monitoring random, a possible response rests in the 
legitimacy of the current policy.  As long as there is no absolute police presence, 
the areas patrolled under regular policy are limited, which means the other areas 
are discriminated against.  This is done, however, based on contemporary needs, 
e.g. calls for assistance or more problematic areas.  As explained previously, the 
problematic areas would still receive special attention, yet, in a random manner.  
                                                                                                                                    
 
145 IRS Audits, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-
Self-Employed/IRS-Audits (last updated July 10, 2015).  I would like to thank Jeffrey Rachlinski 
for this constructive example. 
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Furthermore, the fact the new policy would also cover other areas might even 
increase the legitimacy of monitoring decisions.  The reason for that is 
minimization of the crime displacement risk.  Thus, there is a rationale justifying 
the new policy, and in turn, increasing its legitimacy. 
 
F.  Contrasting Biases 
 
A somewhat different counterargument against the suggested policy is 
that there are other biases, which may work in the opposite direction and distort 
the effect of ambiguity aversion.  One such bias is overconfidence.149  Criminals 
might be overconfident regarding their chances to escape the enforcement 
authorities and hence, not be deterred by the new policy. 
Nevertheless, despite this bias, the policy might still be effective.  First, 
as suggested by Nuno Garoupa, the same overconfidence bias also leads those 
offenders to take fewer precautions to escape from the law enforcement that 
makes their detection easier.150  Second, the suggested policy does not deal with 
the probability of detection as such, but with ambiguity aversion of criminals.  
Namely, whereas offenders might underestimate their probability of being 
apprehended in regular circumstances, the new policy will attempt to eliminate 
their sense of capacity to know those probabilities.  Third, the empirical evidence 
suggesting there is a deterrence effect implies that the overconfidence problem is 
not so burdensome.  Otherwise, since the actual probability of getting punished is 
almost never approaching one hundred percent, with vast overconfidence one 
should observe a very weak or non-existing deterrence effect. 
 
G.  Comparative Ignorance Hypothesis 
 
Craig Fox and Amos Tversky challenged the ambiguity aversion 
phenomenon and proclaimed that its effect exists only in a comparative setting.151  
That is, people express ambiguity aversion in circumstances where they have a 
choice between clear and vague prospects.152  On the contrary, evaluation of an 
uncertain event in isolation from other choices leads to assessment of its 
likelihood while disregarding the vagueness of the event.153  The authors called 
this phenomenon “comparative ignorance hypothesis” and supported it with 
experimental evidence.154 
                                                                                                                                    
 
149 See McAdams & Ulen, supra note 12, at 17. 
150 Nuno Garoupa, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Crime: A Critical Review, 15 EUR. J. LAW 
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Relying on the comparative ignorance hypothesis, one might argue that 
introducing ambiguity aversion into the probability of detection would not affect 
potential criminals.  However, there might be two possible replies to this 
counterargument.  First, as discussed previously, Lougharn, et al. present 
empirical evidence that real offenders are ambiguity averse in the context of their 
decision whether to commit a crime.155  On the one hand, a conceivable 
explanation might be that the results of Fox and Tversky are relevant only in the 
context of gains, while in cases where people face expected losses (as criminals 
do) there is ambiguity aversion even in a non-comparative setting.156  On the 
other hand, a possible account of the results might be that due to a learning 
process, offenders perceive their choices (vague vs. risky) as comparable.157 
Second, even under the assumption that the effect is stronger in a 
comparative prospect, it is possible to publicize the new ambiguous monitoring 
policy while framing it as a comparative policy.  To be precise, the new policy 
might be presented as a transformation from risky apprehension to random police 
methods, which no longer can be predicted.  As a result, it might intensify the 
ambiguity aversion effect and serve as a crime deterrence mechanism. 
 
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS AND OUTLOOK 
 
The probability of apprehension and punishment plays an important role 
in crime deterrence.  This component includes the efficient function of different 
enforcement agents, i.e. police, prosecution, courts and lastly, correction 
agencies.158  Even though the severity of the imposed punishment is relevant in 
the crime control discussion, it seems as if it has a less significant impact on 
criminals.  Consequently, the discourse on the enforcement policy should focus 
on the efficiency of agents involved in controlling the probability of detection 
and punishment. 
Police force is the first authority to respond to crime.  They are 
responsible to initiate the action of the law enforcement system.  In order to 
enable the other agents to act against misconducts, they need to commence 
monitoring and investigation159 of crimes.  While other stages are important as 
                                                                                                                                    
 
155 Lougharn et al., supra note 15, at 1029-30. 
156 In their paper, Fox and Tversky, supra note 151, framed all the experiments as gains.  The 
Prospect theory suggests however, that people have different preferences when facing gains or 
losses, Kahneman and Tversky, supra note 42.  Thus, it is suggested that people might be 
ambiguity averse even without a comparative setting once it is framed as a loss. 
157 It is probable that during criminals’ “career” the perceived probabilities of apprehension are 
becoming more certain.  Hence, they are acting in a comparative world where they may prefer the 
clearer event of risk as compared to the initial vague situation. 
158 In this paper, “correction agencies” refers to the authorities in charge of executing the imposed 
sanctions, whether it is imprisonment, collection of fines, or other sanctions. 
159 In some of the EU countries, prosecution has a considerable role in the investigation of crimes 
once they were reported or discovered by the police. 
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well for crime control, police is the inevitable first phase without which the 
enforcement system cannot begin to function.  This notion is supported by 
empirical evidence, discussed in this paper, which demonstrate the effect of the 
police on crime. 
Despite its importance, it is not an easy task to increase police efficiency.  
It entails high tangible and social costs.  Forasmuch as enforcement authorities 
act within a limited budget, this concern cannot be disregarded, all the more so 
when countries face crisis, such as the EU fiscal turmoil.  Thus, this paper 
discusses the possibility of introducing somewhat different policing methods in 
order to enhance deterrence while saving costs of constant police presence. 
The suggested policy changes are based on the behavioral law and 
economics approach and on empirical evidence supporting the fundamental 
elements of this policy.  Distinct from the classic assumption of the rational 
agent, the behavioral approach recognizes the limitations in the human cognition.  
In accordance with this approach people have bounded rationality and when 
facing uncertain decisions, they tend to apply rules of thumb.  The latter, albeit 
useful to cope with the cognitive limitations, might lead to erroneous judgments.  
Yet, those errors are systematic, and thereby, predictable. 
In the past decades behavioral scholars discussed the relevance of 
heuristics and biases in the criminal framework.  They assert that even though 
offenders’ perception of risks is influenced by heuristics, they still make some 
assessments of costs and benefits.  Therefore, behavioral studies focus on 
analyzing which and how those heuristics might affect criminal conduct.  
Nevertheless, the question in what manner heuristics influence offenders is not 
the only interesting inquiry in the context of criminal law.  The next step should 
be investigating the possibilities in which these findings may assist in designing a 
better crime control policy, and this is attempted in this paper. 
Vast empirical evidence has established the notion that people are 
ambiguity averse, and tend to avoid choices that are uncertain to them.  This 
phenomenon has been extended also to the framework of criminal law.  
Subsequently, a few studies offer to introduce ambiguity into the probability of 
detection, and present empirical evidence that this uncertainty has a deterrent 
effect.  In contribution to these studies, this paper elaborates on the structured 
policy changes which would introduce ambiguity into the probability of 
detection.  Furthermore, the present paper presents evidence that potential 
violators in the tax policy area are not aware of policy changes.  Forasmuch as 
awareness is crucial for the efficiency of ambiguity in deterring crime, this kind 
of problem needs to be addressed.  Therefore, this study discusses the ways to 
use availability heuristic in order to increase criminals’ awareness of the new 
policy.  Finally, this study carefully deliberates possible limitations of this type of 
policy and attempts to reconcile those objections.  There is a scope for further 
research of the costs of publicity and its optimal usage.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A1: Survey Results 
 
Variable Survey 1 Survey 2 
Number of respondents N 76 139 
Age   
Average age  36 40 
Min. Age  20 19 
Max Age 63 65 
Maximum education level    
High school 17% 21% 
University 83% 77% 
Other - 1% 
Gender (% of Male)  53% 72% 
Area (most of life)   
North Italy 64% 69% 
South Italy 31% 30% 
Outside Italy 5% 1% 
Existence of the policy nowadays   
Yes 83% 72% 
Source of Information*   
Family 22% 20% 
Friends 11% 6% 
Media 23% 39% 
School or University 8% 7% 
Other 30% 29% 
Punishment for Non-Compliance*   
Warning - 5% 
Fine 80% 86% 
Prison 2% 1% 
Community Service - 1% 
Probation - - 
Other 2% 2% 
Do not Know 9% 6% 
Knowledge about the rate of detection*   
None 69% 74% 
1 14% 14% 
2-10 9% 9% 
11 or more - 3% 
Compliance*   
Friends Comply 58% 51% 
Self-Compliance 77% 78% 
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Existence of the law in the past**    
No 8% 56% 
 
Source: This table is a summary of the data collected and analyzed by me 
through a survey. 
Note: Only the people who stated that the policy currently exists were 
required to answer the questions marked with *.  Therefore, the percentage 
presented in the table regarding these questions is the number of respondents 
choosing this option/the number of respondents who answered this question.  The 
results of the last question, marked **, refer to the respondents who said the law 
did not exist/the responded who stated the law does not exists now. 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
Original - Survey 1 (and in brackets the changes made in Survey 2):160 
 
Questo sondaggio ti farà delle domande riguardo a una particolare legge italiana. 
Ci sono nove domande e ti richiederà approssimativamente due minuti per completarlo. 
Le risposte che darai in questo sondaggio sono anonime e saranno usate solo in forma 
aggregata (il che significa che le risposte non verranno esaminate una per una, ma 
saranno prese in considerazione le risposte di tutti coloro che parteciperanno al 
sondaggio). Non verrai identificato in alcun modo per le risposte che darai. I dettagli 
demografici come l’età, sono raccolti sono con lo scopo di determinare tendenze generali 
riguardo ai dati, non per identificarti. Per assicurare che le tue risposte sono 
assolutamente confidenziali, il codice IP (il codice che è unico per ogni computer) non 
sarà collegato ai dati. Grazie per il tuo contributo a questa ricerca. 
 
Se tu fossi interessato a ricevere i risultati generali di questo sondaggio o per 
qualsiasi domanda riguardo all’argomento scrivi a  
 
1. Quanti anni hai e Qual è il tuo livello di istruzione? (per esempio: 22, scuola 
superiore) 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Genere 
 
(1) F    
(2) M 
 
3. In quale area geografica italiana hai vissuto maggiormente?  
 
(1) Nord Italia    
(2) Sud Italia    
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(3) Fuori dall’italia 
 
4. In accordo con l’attuale legge italiana, ci sono in Italia consumatori obbligati a 
prendere una ricevuta (scontrino) dopo aver fatto un acquisto di qualunque 
genere?  
[Survey 2: In accordo con l’attuale legge italiana, i CONSUMATORI sono 
obbligati a richiedere una ricevuta (scontrino) dopo aver fatto un acquisto 
di qualunque genere?] 
 
(1) Si  
(2) No 
 
Se ha risposto "SI" alla domanda 4, continui a rispondere alle domande da 5 a 9, 
altrimenti passi direttamente alla domanda 10. 
 
5. Come sei venuto a conoscenza di questa legge? 
 
(1) Famiglia   
(2) Amici   
(3) Telegiornale  
(4) Scuola o università   
(5) Altri 
 
6. Qual è la massima pena per non aver rispettato questa legge/regola? 
[Survey 2: Qual è la massima pena che puo’ essere imposta a un 
CONSUMATORE per non aver rispettato questa legge/regola?] 
 
(1)Un richiamo  
(2) multa  
(3) Prigione    
(4) servizio socialmente utile   
(5) libertà vigilata  
(6) altri  
(7) non lo so 
 
7. Quante persone conosci che sono stati colti  o puniti per non aver rispettato 
questa legge/regola? 
 
(1) Nessuno   
(2) 1  
(3) 2-10  
(4) 11 o più 
 
8. I tuoi amici rispettano questa legge/regola? 
 
(1) Si  
(2) No 
 
9. Tu rispetti questa legge/regola? 
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(1) Si  
(2) No 
 
10. Questa legge/regola è esistita in passato? 
 
(1) Si 
(2) No 
 
Grazie per la tua partecipazione a questo sondaggio. Le tue risposte sono confidenziali. 
Se tu fossi interessato a ricevere i risultati generali di questo sondaggio o per qualsiasi 
domanda riguardo all’argomento scrivi a elena.reznichenko@edle-phd.eu 
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Translated to English – Survey 1(and in brackets the changes made in 
Survey 2):161 
 
This survey asks you questions about your knowledge of a particular law in 
Italy. There are nine questions and it will take you approximately two minutes to finish. 
The answers you give in this survey are anonymous and will only be used in aggregate 
form (that is, individual answers will not be examined, only the trend of answers from all 
respondents). You will not be identified in any way by the answers you give. 
Demographic details such as age are gathered only for the purposes of determining 
aggregate trends in the data, not to identify you. To ensure your answers are completely 
confidential the IP code (the code which is unique to each computer) will not be collected 
with the data. Thank you for your help with this research. 
 
If you would like to receive the aggregate results of this survey or have any 
questions about the subject area please email  
 
1. What is your age and maximum level of education? (e.g. 22, high school) 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Gender 
(1) F  
(2) M 
 
3. In which area of Italy did you spend most of your life? 
(1) North Italy  
(2) South Italy  
(3) Outside of Italy 
 
4. According to the current Italian law, are buyers in Italy obliged to take a receipt 
after making a purchase of any kind? 
[Survey 2: According to the current Italian law, are CONSUMERS obliged 
to ask for a receipt after making a purchase of any kind?] 
 
(1) Yes  
(2) No 
 
If you answered ‘YES’ to the previous question, please continue answering 
questions 5-9. If you answered ‘NO’ in the previous question, please answer 
question 10. 
 
5. How did you come to know about this law/rule? 
(1) Family  
(2) Friends  
(3) News  
(4) Schools or University  
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(5) Other 
 
6. What is the maximum punishment for not complying with this law/rule? 
[Survey 2: What is the maximum punishment that can be imposed on a 
CONSUMER for not complying with this law/rule?] 
 
(1) Warning  
(2) Fine  
(3) Prison  
(4) Community service  
(5) Probation  
(6) Other  
(7) Don’t know  
 
7. How many people do you know who have been caught or punished for not 
complying with this law/rule? 
 
(1) None  
(2) 1  
(3) 2-10  
(4) 11 and more 
 
8. Do your friends comply with this law/rule? 
(1) Yes  
(2) No 
 
9. Do you comply with this law/rule? 
(1) Yes  
(2) No 
 
10. Did this law/rule exist in the past?  
(1) Yes   
(2) No 
 
Thank you for your participation in this survey. Your responses are confidential. 
If you would like to receive the aggregate results of this survey or have any questions 
about the subject area please email elena.reznichenko@edle-phd.eu  

